Difference between revisions of "SFTP chroot"

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m (Adding new chrooted users)
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At the end of the file, add something similar to the following for a group:
 
At the end of the file, add something similar to the following for a group:
 
   Match Group sftpusers
 
   Match Group sftpusers
     ChrootDirectory %h
+
     ChrootDirectory /home
 
     ForceCommand internal-sftp
 
     ForceCommand internal-sftp
 
     AllowTcpForwarding no
 
     AllowTcpForwarding no
Line 19: Line 19:
 
Or for a user:
 
Or for a user:
 
   Match User username
 
   Match User username
     ChrootDirectory %h
+
     ChrootDirectory /home
 
     ForceCommand internal-sftp
 
     ForceCommand internal-sftp
  
The %h represents the users home directory.
+
The /home represents root of the users home directory.
 
+
Change ownership of chrooted dir to root (for more details see at the end):
+
chown root ~user
+
  
 
Restart sshd:
 
Restart sshd:
  # /etc/rc.d/sshd restart
+
  # systemctl restart sshd.service
  
 
===Adding new chrooted users===
 
===Adding new chrooted users===
Line 34: Line 31:
 
   usermod -g sftpusers
 
   usermod -g sftpusers
  
Also, set their shell to /dbin/nologin to prevent a normal ssh login:
+
Also, set their shell to /sbin/nologin to prevent a normal ssh login:
 
   usermod -s /sbin/nologin
 
   usermod -s /sbin/nologin
  
 
You also need to add /sbin/nologin to /etc/shells, or the sftp-users won't be able to login.
 
You also need to add /sbin/nologin to /etc/shells, or the sftp-users won't be able to login.
 +
 +
Also, you must change home user to /username, because chroot will append /username to root of home ( in this case is /home ).
 +
 +
{{Warning|Some daemon users erroneously specify 'nologin' as their shell as one way of ensuring that these users cannot log-in. If 'nologin' is added as a valid shell, users should make sure that these daemon user accounts are sufficiently locked. Alternatively, the affected user accounts can be changed to use /usr/bin/false as shell to ensure that the selected shell is considered invalid by PAM}}
  
 
Note that since this is only for sftp, a proper chroot environment with a shell and /dev/* doesn't need to be created.
 
Note that since this is only for sftp, a proper chroot environment with a shell and /dev/* doesn't need to be created.
Line 95: Line 96:
  
 
Restart logging and SSH:
 
Restart logging and SSH:
   /etc/rc.d/syslog-ng restart
+
   systemctl restart syslog-ng.service
   /etc/rc.d/ssh restart
+
   systemctl restart sshd.service
  
 
{{ic|/usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev/log}} should now exist.
 
{{ic|/usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev/log}} should now exist.
Line 116: Line 117:
 
  sshd[12399]: fatal: bad ownership or modes for chroot directory component "/path/of/chroot/directory/"   
 
  sshd[12399]: fatal: bad ownership or modes for chroot directory component "/path/of/chroot/directory/"   
  
It's ChrootDirectory ownership problem, sshd will reject sftp connections to accounts that are set to chroot into any directory that has ownership/permissions that sshd doesn't consider secure. sshd's apparently strict ownership/permissions requirements dictate that every directory in the chroot path must be owned by root and only writable for the owner. So, for example, if the chroot environment is in a user's home directory both /home and /home/username must be owned by root and have permissions along the lines of 755 or 750 ( group ownership should allow user to access ).
+
This is a {{ic|ChrootDirectory}} ownership problemsshd will reject SFTP connections to accounts that are set to chroot into any directory that has ownership/permissions that sshd considers insecure. sshd's strict ownership/permissions requirements dictate that every directory in the chroot path must be owned by root and only writable by the owner. So, for example, if the chroot environment is /home must be owned by root.
 +
See below for possible alternatives.
 +
 
 +
The reason for this is to [http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2009-May/027651.html prevent a user from escalating their privileges] and becoming root, escaping the chroot environment.
  
 
If chroot environment is in user's home directory, make sure user have access to it's home directory, or user would not be able to access it's publickey, produce following error  
 
If chroot environment is in user's home directory, make sure user have access to it's home directory, or user would not be able to access it's publickey, produce following error  
 
  Permission denied (publickey).
 
  Permission denied (publickey).
 +
 +
== Write access to chroot dir ==
 +
 +
As above, if a user is able to write to the chroot directory then it is possible for them to escalate their privileges to root and escape the chroot.  One way around this is to give the user two home directories - one "real" home they can write to, and one SFTP home that is locked down to keep sshd happy and your system secure.  By using {{ic|mount --bind}} you can make the real home directory appear as a subdirectory inside the SFTP home directory, allowing them full access to their real home directory.
 +
 +
This can also be used to achieve other goals.  For example, a user's home directory can be locked down per the sshd chroot rules, and bind mounts used to provide users access to other directories:
 +
 +
# mkdir /home/user/web
 +
# mount --bind /srv/web/example.com /home/user/web
 +
 +
Now the user can log in with SFTP, they are chrooted to {{ic|/home/user}}, but they see a folder called "web" they can access to manipulate files on a web site (assuming they have correct permissions in {{ic|/srv/web/example.com}}.
  
 
==Links & References==
 
==Links & References==
 
*[http://www.minstrel.org.uk/papers/sftp/ http://www.minstrel.org.uk/papers/sftp/builtin/]
 
*[http://www.minstrel.org.uk/papers/sftp/ http://www.minstrel.org.uk/papers/sftp/builtin/]
 
*[http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config]
 
*[http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd_config]

Revision as of 01:55, 22 February 2014

OpenSSH 4.9+ includes a built-in chroot for sftp, but requires a few tweaks to the normal install.

Installation

This package is available in the core repository. To install it, run

# pacman -S openssh

Configuration

In /etc/ssh/sshd_config, modify the Subsystem line for sftp:

 Subsystem       sftp    internal-sftp

At the end of the file, add something similar to the following for a group:

 Match Group sftpusers
   ChrootDirectory /home
   ForceCommand internal-sftp
   AllowTcpForwarding no

Or for a user:

 Match User username
   ChrootDirectory /home
   ForceCommand internal-sftp

The /home represents root of the users home directory.

Restart sshd:

# systemctl restart sshd.service

Adding new chrooted users

If using the group method above, ensure all sftp users are put in the appropriate group, i.e.:

 usermod -g sftpusers

Also, set their shell to /sbin/nologin to prevent a normal ssh login:

 usermod -s /sbin/nologin

You also need to add /sbin/nologin to /etc/shells, or the sftp-users won't be able to login.

Also, you must change home user to /username, because chroot will append /username to root of home ( in this case is /home ).

Warning: Some daemon users erroneously specify 'nologin' as their shell as one way of ensuring that these users cannot log-in. If 'nologin' is added as a valid shell, users should make sure that these daemon user accounts are sufficiently locked. Alternatively, the affected user accounts can be changed to use /usr/bin/false as shell to ensure that the selected shell is considered invalid by PAM

Note that since this is only for sftp, a proper chroot environment with a shell and /dev/* doesn't need to be created.

Their chroot will be the same as their home directory. The permissions are not the same as a normal home, though. Their home directory must be owned as root and not writable by another user or group. This includes the path leading to the directory. My recommendation is to use /usr/local/chroot as a root and build the home directories under that.

Logging

1)

The user will not be able to access /dev/log. This can be seen by running strace on the process once the user connects and attempts to download a file. Create the sub-dircetory dev in the ChrootDirectory, for example:

 sudo mkdir /usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev
 sudo chmod 755 /usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev

syslog-ng will create the device /usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev/log once configured.

2)

Add to /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf a new source for the log and add the configuration, for example change the section:

source src {
  unix-dgram("/dev/log");
  internal();
  file("/proc/kmsg");
};

to:

source src {
  unix-dgram("/dev/log");
  internal();
  file("/proc/kmsg");
  unix-dgram("/usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev/log");
};

and append:

#sftp configuration
destination sftp { file("/var/log/sftp.log"); };
filter f_sftp { program("internal-sftp"); };
log { source(src); filter(f_sftp); destination(sftp); };

(Optional) If you'd like to similarly log SSH messages to it's own file:

#sshd configuration
destination ssh { file("/var/log/ssh.log"); };
filter f_ssh { program("sshd"); };
log { source(src); filter(f_ssh); destination(ssh); };

(From Syslog-ng#Move_log_to_another_file)

3)

Edit /etc/ssh/sshd_config to replace all instances of internal-sftp with internal-sftp -f AUTH -l VERBOSE

4)

Restart logging and SSH:

 systemctl restart syslog-ng.service
 systemctl restart sshd.service

/usr/local/chroot/theuser/dev/log should now exist.

Testing your chroot

# ssh username@localhost

should refuse the connection or fail on login. The response varies, possibly due to the version of OpenSSH used.

# sftp username@localhost

should place you in the chroot'd environment.

Troubleshooting

Error while trying to connect

Write failed: Broken pipe                                                                                               
Couldn't read packet: Connection reset by peer

If you also find similar message in /var/log/auth.log

sshd[12399]: fatal: bad ownership or modes for chroot directory component "/path/of/chroot/directory/"  

This is a ChrootDirectory ownership problem. sshd will reject SFTP connections to accounts that are set to chroot into any directory that has ownership/permissions that sshd considers insecure. sshd's strict ownership/permissions requirements dictate that every directory in the chroot path must be owned by root and only writable by the owner. So, for example, if the chroot environment is /home must be owned by root. See below for possible alternatives.

The reason for this is to prevent a user from escalating their privileges and becoming root, escaping the chroot environment.

If chroot environment is in user's home directory, make sure user have access to it's home directory, or user would not be able to access it's publickey, produce following error

Permission denied (publickey).

Write access to chroot dir

As above, if a user is able to write to the chroot directory then it is possible for them to escalate their privileges to root and escape the chroot. One way around this is to give the user two home directories - one "real" home they can write to, and one SFTP home that is locked down to keep sshd happy and your system secure. By using mount --bind you can make the real home directory appear as a subdirectory inside the SFTP home directory, allowing them full access to their real home directory.

This can also be used to achieve other goals. For example, a user's home directory can be locked down per the sshd chroot rules, and bind mounts used to provide users access to other directories:

# mkdir /home/user/web
# mount --bind /srv/web/example.com /home/user/web

Now the user can log in with SFTP, they are chrooted to /home/user, but they see a folder called "web" they can access to manipulate files on a web site (assuming they have correct permissions in /srv/web/example.com.

Links & References