dm-crypt/Encrypting an entire system

The following are examples of common scenarios of full system encryption with dm-crypt. They explain all the adaptations that need to be done to the normal installation procedure. All the necessary tools are on the installation image.

If you want to encrypt an existing unencrypted file system, see dm-crypt/Device encryption#Encrypt an existing unencrypted file system.

Overview

Securing a root filesystem is where dm-crypt excels, feature and performance-wise. Unlike selectively encrypting non-root filesystems, an encrypted root filesystem can conceal information such as which programs are installed, the usernames of all user accounts, and common data-leakage vectors such as mlocate and /var/log/. Furthermore, an encrypted root filesystem makes tampering with the system far more difficult, as everything except the boot loader and (usually) the kernel is encrypted.

All scenarios illustrated in the following share these advantages, other pros and cons differentiating them are summarized below:

Scenarios	Advantages	Disadvantages
#LUKS on a partition shows a basic and straightforward set-up for a fully LUKS encrypted root.	Simple partitioning and setup On a GPT partitioned disk, systemd can auto-mount the root partition.	Inflexible; disk-space to be encrypted has to be pre-allocated
#LVM on LUKS achieves partitioning flexibility by using LVM inside a single LUKS encrypted partition.	Simple partitioning with knowledge of LVM Only one key required to unlock all volumes (e.g. easy resume-from-disk setup) Volume layout not visible when locked Easiest method to allow suspension to disk	LVM adds an additional mapping layer and hook Less useful, if a singular volume should receive a separate key
#LUKS on LVM uses dm-crypt only after the LVM is setup.	LVM can be used to have encrypted volumes span multiple disks Easy mix of un-/encrypted volume groups	Complex; changing volumes requires changing encryption mappers too Volumes require individual keys LVM layout is visible when locked Slower boot time; each encrypted LV must be unlocked seperately
#LUKS on software RAID uses dm-crypt only after RAID is setup.	Analogous to LUKS on LVM	Analogous to LUKS on LVM
#Plain dm-crypt uses dm-crypt plain mode, i.e. without a LUKS header and its options for multiple keys. This scenario also employs USB devices for `/boot` and key storage, which may be applied to the other scenarios.	Data resilience for cases where a LUKS header may be damaged Allows Full Disk Encryption Helps addressing problems with SSDs	High care to all encryption parameters is required Single encryption key and no option to change it
#Encrypted boot partition (GRUB) shows how to encrypt the boot partition using the GRUB bootloader. This scenario also employs an EFI system partition, which may be applied to the other scenarios.	Same advantages as the scenario the installation is based on (LVM on LUKS for this particular example) Less data is left unencrypted, i.e. the boot loader and the EFI system partition, if present	Same disadvantages as the scenario the installation is based on (LVM on LUKS for this particular example) More complicated configuration Not supported by other boot loaders
#Btrfs subvolumes with swap shows how to encrypt a Btrfs system, including the `/boot` directory, also adding a partition for swap, on UEFI hardware.	Similar advantages as #Encrypted boot partition (GRUB) Availability of Btrfs' features	Similar disadvantages as #Encrypted boot partition (GRUB)
#Root on ZFS

While all above scenarios provide much greater protection from outside threats than encrypted secondary filesystems, they also share a common disadvantage: any user in possession of the encryption key is able to decrypt the entire drive, and therefore can access other users' data. If that is of concern, it is possible to use a combination of block device and stacked filesystem encryption and reap the advantages of both. See Data-at-rest encryption to plan ahead.

See dm-crypt/Drive preparation#Partitioning for a general overview of the partitioning strategies used in the scenarios.

Another area to consider is whether to set up an encrypted swap partition and what kind. See dm-crypt/Swap encryption for alternatives.

If you anticipate to protect the system's data not only against physical theft, but also have a requirement of precautions against logical tampering, see dm-crypt/Specialties#Securing the unencrypted boot partition for further possibilities after following one of the scenarios.

For solid state drives you might want to consider enabling TRIM support, but be warned, there are potential security implications. See dm-crypt/Specialties#Discard/TRIM support for solid state drives (SSD) for more information.

Warning:

In any scenario, never use file system repair software such as fsck directly on an encrypted volume, or it will destroy any means to recover the key used to decrypt your files. Such tools must be used on the decrypted (opened) device instead.
For the LUKS2 format:
- GRUB's support for LUKS2 is limited; see GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details. Use LUKS1 (cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1) for partitions that GRUB will need to unlock.
- The LUKS2 format has a high RAM usage per design, defaulting to 1GB per encrypted mapper. Machines with low RAM and/or multiple LUKS2 partitions unlocked in parallel may error on boot. See the --pbkdf-memory option to control memory usage.[1]

LUKS on a partition

This example covers a full system encryption with dm-crypt + LUKS in a simple partition layout:

+-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+
| Boot partition        | LUKS2 encrypted system | Optional free space   |
|                       | partition              | for additional        |
|                       |                        | partitions to be set  |
| /boot                 | /                      | up later              |
|                       |                        |                       |
|                       | /dev/mapper/root       |                       |
|                       |------------------------|                       |
| /dev/sda1             | /dev/sda2              |                       |
+-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+

The first steps can be performed directly after booting the Arch Linux install image.

Preparing the disk

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation.

Then create the needed partitions, at least one for / (e.g. /dev/sda2) and /boot (/dev/sda1). See Partitioning.

Preparing non-boot partitions

The following commands create and mount the encrypted root partition. They correspond to the procedure described in detail in dm-crypt/Encrypting a non-root file system#Partition (which, despite the title, can be applied to root partitions, as long as mkinitcpio and the boot loader are correctly configured). If you want to use particular non-default encryption options (e.g. cipher, key length), see the encryption options before executing the first command. For information on changing the default sector size, see dm-crypt/Device encryption#Sector size.

# cryptsetup -y -v luksFormat /dev/sda2
# cryptsetup open /dev/sda2 root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/root
# mount /dev/mapper/root /mnt

Check the mapping works as intended:

# umount /mnt
# cryptsetup close root
# cryptsetup open /dev/sda2 root
# mount /dev/mapper/root /mnt

If you created separate partitions (e.g. /home), these steps have to be adapted and repeated for all of them, except for /boot. See dm-crypt/Encrypting a non-root file system#Automated unlocking and mounting on how to handle additional partitions at boot.

Note that each block device requires its own passphrase. This may be inconvenient, because it results in a separate passphrase to be input during boot. An alternative is to use a keyfile stored in the system partition to unlock the separate partition via crypttab. See dm-crypt/Device encryption#Using LUKS to format partitions with a keyfile for instructions.

Preparing the boot partition

What you do have to setup is a non-encrypted /boot partition, which is needed for an encrypted root. For an ordinary boot partition on BIOS systems, for example, execute:

# mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1

or for an EFI system partition on UEFI systems:

# mkfs.fat -F32 /dev/sda1

Afterwards create the directory for the mountpoint and mount the partition:

# mount --mkdir /dev/sda1 /mnt/boot

Mounting the devices

At Installation guide#Mount the file systems you will have to mount the mapped devices, not the actual partitions. Of course /boot, which is not encrypted, will still have to be mounted directly.

Configuring mkinitcpio

Add the keyboard, keymap and encrypt hooks to mkinitcpio.conf. If the default US keymap is fine for you, you can omit the keymap hook.

HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block encrypt filesystems fsck)

If using the sd-encrypt hook with the systemd-based initramfs, the following needs to be set instead:

HOOKS=(base systemd autodetect modconf kms keyboard sd-vconsole block sd-encrypt filesystems fsck)

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Configuring the boot loader

In order to unlock the encrypted root partition at boot, the following kernel parameters need to be set by the boot loader:

cryptdevice=UUID=device-UUID:root root=/dev/mapper/root

If using the sd-encrypt hook, the following need to be set instead:

rd.luks.name=device-UUID=root root=/dev/mapper/root

The device-UUID refers to the UUID of the LUKS superblock, in this case /dev/sda2. See Persistent block device naming for details.

Also see dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters for more details.

Tip: If the root partition is on the same disk as the /boot partition and your UEFI boot loader supports GPT partition automounting, you can configure the partition type GUID and rely on systemd-gpt-auto-generator(8) instead of using the kernel parameters.

LVM on LUKS

The straightforward method is to set up LVM on top of the encrypted partition instead of the other way round. Technically the LVM is setup inside one big encrypted block device. Hence, the LVM is not visible until the block device is unlocked and the underlying volume structure is scanned and mounted during boot.

The disk layout in this example is:

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------+
| Logical volume 1      | Logical volume 2      | Logical volume 3      | | Boot partition |
|                       |                       |                       | |                |
| [SWAP]                | /                     | /home                 | | /boot          |
|                       |                       |                       | |                |
| /dev/MyVolGroup/swap  | /dev/MyVolGroup/root  | /dev/MyVolGroup/home  | |                |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| | (may be on     |
|                                                                       | | other device)  |
|                         LUKS2 encrypted partition                     | |                |
|                           /dev/sda1                                   | | /dev/sdb1      |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------+

Note: While using the encrypt hook this method does not allow you to span the logical volumes over multiple disks; either use the sd-encrypt or see dm-crypt/Specialties#Modifying the encrypt hook for multiple partitions.

Tip: Two variants of this setup:

Instructions at dm-crypt/Specialties#Encrypted system using a detached LUKS header use this setup with a detached LUKS header on a USB device to achieve a two factor authentication with it.
Instructions at dm-crypt/Specialties#Encrypted /boot and a detached LUKS header on USB use this setup with a detached LUKS header, encrypted /boot partition, and encrypted keyfile all on a USB device.

Preparing the disk

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation.

Tip: When using the GRUB boot loader for BIOS booting from a GPT disk, create a BIOS boot partition.

Create a partition to be mounted at /boot with a size of 200 MiB or more.

Tip: UEFI systems can use the EFI system partition for /boot.

Create a partition which will later contain the encrypted container.

Create the LUKS encrypted container at the "system" partition. Enter the chosen password twice.

# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda1

For more information about the available cryptsetup options see the LUKS encryption options prior to above command.

Open the container:

# cryptsetup open /dev/sda1 cryptlvm

The decrypted container is now available at /dev/mapper/cryptlvm.

Preparing the logical volumes

Create a physical volume on top of the opened LUKS container:

# pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm

Create a volume group (in this example named MyVolGroup, but it can be whatever you want) and add the previously created physical volume to it:

# vgcreate MyVolGroup /dev/mapper/cryptlvm

Create all your logical volumes on the volume group:

Tip: If a logical volume will be formatted with ext4, leave at least 256 MiB free space in the volume group to allow using e2scrub(8). After creating the last volume with -l 100%FREE, this can be accomplished by reducing its size with lvreduce -L -256M MyVolGroup/home.

# lvcreate -L 8G MyVolGroup -n swap
# lvcreate -L 32G MyVolGroup -n root
# lvcreate -l 100%FREE MyVolGroup -n home

Format your filesystems on each logical volume:

# mkfs.ext4 /dev/MyVolGroup/root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/MyVolGroup/home
# mkswap /dev/MyVolGroup/swap

Mount your filesystems:

# mount /dev/MyVolGroup/root /mnt
# mount --mkdir /dev/MyVolGroup/home /mnt/home
# swapon /dev/MyVolGroup/swap

Preparing the boot partition

The bootloader loads the kernel, initramfs, and its own configuration files from the /boot directory. Any filesystem on a disk that can be read by the bootloader is eligible.

Create a filesystem on the partition intended for /boot:

# mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb1

Tip: When opting to keep /boot on an EFI system partition the recommended formatting is

# mkfs.fat -F32 /dev/sdb1

Mount the partition to /mnt/boot:

# mount --mkdir /dev/sdb1 /mnt/boot

At this point resume the common Installation guide#Installation steps. Return to this page to customize the Initramfs and Boot loader steps.

Configuring mkinitcpio

Make sure the lvm2 package is installed and add the keyboard, keymap, encrypt and lvm2 hooks to mkinitcpio.conf:

HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

If using the sd-encrypt hook with the systemd-based initramfs, the following needs to be set instead:

HOOKS=(base systemd autodetect modconf kms keyboard sd-vconsole block sd-encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Configuring the boot loader

In order to unlock the encrypted root partition at boot, the following kernel parameter needs to be set by the boot loader:

cryptdevice=UUID=device-UUID:cryptlvm root=/dev/MyVolGroup/root

If using the sd-encrypt hook, the following needs to be set instead:

rd.luks.name=device-UUID=cryptlvm root=/dev/MyVolGroup/root

The device-UUID refers to the UUID of the LUKS superblock, in this case /dev/sda1. See Persistent block device naming for details.

If using dracut, you may need a more extensive list of parameters, try:

kernel_cmdline="rd.luks.uuid=luks-deviceUUID rd.lvm.lv=MyVolGroup/root  rd.lvm.lv=MyVolGroup/swap  root=/dev/mapper/MyVolGroup-root rootfstype=ext4 rootflags=rw,relatime"

See dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters for details.

LUKS on LVM

To use encryption on top of LVM, the LVM volumes are set up first and then used as the base for the encrypted partitions. This way, a mixture of encrypted and non-encrypted volumes/partitions is possible as well.

Tip: Unlike #LVM on LUKS, this method allows normally spanning the logical volumes over multiple disks.

The following short example creates a LUKS on LVM setup and mixes in the use of a key-file for the /home partition and temporary crypt volumes for /tmp and /swap. The latter is considered desirable from a security perspective, because no potentially sensitive temporary data survives the reboot, when the encryption is re-initialised. If you are experienced with LVM, you will be able to ignore/replace LVM and other specifics according to your plan.

If you want to span a logical volume over multiple disks that have already been set up, or expand the logical volume for /home (or any other volume), a procedure to do so is described in dm-crypt/Specialties#Expanding LVM on multiple disks. It is important to note that the LUKS encrypted container has to be resized as well.

This article or section needs expansion.

Reason: The intro of this scenario needs some adjustment now that a comparison has been added to #Overview. A suggested structure is to make it similar to the #LUKS on a partition intro. (Discuss in Talk:Dm-crypt/Encrypting an entire system)

Preparing the disk

Partitioning scheme:

+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Boot partition | dm-crypt plain encrypted volume | LUKS2 encrypted volume        | LUKS2 encrypted volume        |
|                |                                 |                               |                               |
| /boot          | [SWAP]                          | /                             | /home                         |
|                |                                 |                               |                               |
|                | /dev/mapper/swap                | /dev/mapper/root              | /dev/mapper/home              |
|                |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
|                | Logical volume 1                | Logical volume 2              | Logical volume 3              |
|                | /dev/MyVolGroup/cryptswap       | /dev/MyVolGroup/cryptroot     | /dev/MyVolGroup/crypthome     |
|                |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
|                |                                                                                                 |
|   /dev/sda1    |                                   /dev/sda2                                                     |
+----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

Randomise /dev/sda2 according to dm-crypt/Drive preparation#dm-crypt wipe on an empty disk or partition.

Preparing the logical volumes

# pvcreate /dev/sda2
# vgcreate MyVolGroup /dev/sda2
# lvcreate -L 32G -n cryptroot MyVolGroup
# lvcreate -L 500M -n cryptswap MyVolGroup
# lvcreate -L 500M -n crypttmp MyVolGroup
# lvcreate -l 100%FREE -n crypthome MyVolGroup

# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/MyVolGroup/cryptroot
# cryptsetup open /dev/MyVolGroup/cryptroot root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/root
# mount /dev/mapper/root /mnt

More information about the encryption options can be found in dm-crypt/Device encryption#Encryption options for LUKS mode. Note that /home will be encrypted in #Encrypting logical volume /home.

Tip: If you ever have to access the encrypted root from the Arch-ISO, the above open action will allow you to after the LVM shows up.

Preparing the boot partition

# dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda1 bs=1M status=progress
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1
# mount --mkdir /dev/sda1 /mnt/boot

Configuring mkinitcpio

Make sure the lvm2 package is installed and add the keyboard, lvm2 and encrypt hooks to mkinitcpio.conf:

HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block lvm2 encrypt filesystems fsck)

If using the sd-encrypt hook with the systemd-based initramfs, the following needs to be set instead:

HOOKS=(base systemd autodetect modconf kms keyboard sd-vconsole block sd-encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Configuring the boot loader

In order to unlock the encrypted root partition at boot, the following kernel parameters need to be set by the boot loader:

cryptdevice=UUID=device-UUID:root root=/dev/mapper/root

If using the sd-encrypt hook, the following need to be set instead:

rd.luks.name=device-UUID=root root=/dev/mapper/root

The device-UUID refers to the UUID of the LUKS superblock, in this case /dev/MyVolGroup/cryptroot. See Persistent block device naming for details.

See dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters for details.

Configuring fstab and crypttab

Both crypttab and fstab entries are required to both unlock the device and mount the filesystems, respectively. The following lines will re-encrypt the temporary filesystems on each reboot:

/etc/crypttab

swap	/dev/MyVolGroup/cryptswap	/dev/urandom	swap,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=256
tmp	/dev/MyVolGroup/crypttmp	/dev/urandom	tmp,cipher=aes-xts-plain64,size=256

/etc/fstab

/dev/mapper/root        /       ext4            defaults        0       1
/dev/sda1               /boot   ext4            defaults        0       2
/dev/mapper/tmp         /tmp    tmpfs           defaults        0       0
/dev/mapper/swap        none    swap            sw              0       0

Encrypting logical volume /home

Since this scenario uses LVM as the primary and dm-crypt as secondary mapper, each encrypted logical volume requires its own encryption. Yet, unlike the temporary filesystems configured with volatile encryption above, the logical volume for /home should of course be persistent. The following assumes you have rebooted into the installed system, otherwise you have to adjust paths. To save on entering a second passphrase at boot, a keyfile is created:

# mkdir -m 700 /etc/luks-keys
# dd if=/dev/random of=/etc/luks-keys/home bs=1 count=256 status=progress

The logical volume is encrypted with it:

# cryptsetup luksFormat -v /dev/MyVolGroup/crypthome /etc/luks-keys/home
# cryptsetup -d /etc/luks-keys/home open /dev/MyVolGroup/crypthome home
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/home
# mount /dev/mapper/home /home

The encrypted mount is configured in both crypttab and fstab:

/etc/crypttab

home	/dev/MyVolGroup/crypthome   /etc/luks-keys/home

/etc/fstab

/dev/mapper/home        /home   ext4        defaults        0       2

LUKS on software RAID

This example is based on a real-world setup for a workstation class laptop equipped with two SSDs of equal size, and an additional HDD for bulk storage. The end result is LUKS1 based full disk encryption (including /boot) for all drives, with the SSDs in a RAID0 array, and keyfiles used to unlock all encryption after GRUB is given a correct passphrase at boot.

This setup utilizes a very simplistic partitioning scheme, with all the available RAID storage being mounted at / (no separate /boot partition), and the decrypted HDD being mounted at /data.

Please note that regular backups are very important in this setup. If either of the SSDs fail, the data contained in the RAID array will be practically impossible to recover. You may wish to select a different RAID level if fault tolerance is important to you.

The encryption is not deniable in this setup.

For the sake of the instructions below, the following block devices are used:

/dev/sda = first SSD
/dev/sdb = second SSD
/dev/sdc = HDD

+---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------------+
| BIOS boot partition | EFI system partition      | LUKS1 encrypted volume    | | BIOS boot partition | EFI system partition      | LUKS1 encrypted volume    | | LUKS2 encrypted volume    |
|                     |                           |                           | |                     |                           |                           | |                           |
|                     | /efi                      | /                         | |                     | /efi                      | /                         | | /data                     |
|                     |                           |                           | |                     |                           |                           | |                           |
|                     |                           | /dev/mapper/root          | |                     |                           | /dev/mapper/root          | |                           |
|                     +---------------------------+---------------------------+ |                     +---------------------------+---------------------------+ |                           |
|                     | RAID1 array (part 1 of 2) | RAID0 array (part 1 of 2) | |                     | RAID1 array (part 2 of 2) | RAID0 array (part 2 of 2) | |                           |
|                     |                           |                           | |                     |                           |                           | |                           |
|                     | /dev/md/ESP               | /dev/md/root              | |                     | /dev/md/ESP               | /dev/md/root              | | /dev/mapper/data          |
|                     +---------------------------+---------------------------+ |                     +---------------------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------------+
| /dev/sda1           | /dev/sda2                 | /dev/sda3                 | | /dev/sdb1           | /dev/sdb2                 | /dev/sdb3                 | | /dev/sdc1                 |
+---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------+---------------------------+ +---------------------------+

Be sure to substitute them with the appropriate device designations for your setup, as they may be different.

Preparing the disks

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation.

For BIOS systems with GPT, create a BIOS boot partition with size of 1 MiB for GRUB to store the second stage of BIOS bootloader. Do not mount the partition.

For UEFI systems create an EFI system partition with an appropriate size, it will later be mounted at /efi.

In the remaining space on the drive create a partition (/dev/sda3 in this example) for "Linux RAID". Choose partition type ID fd for MBR or partition type GUID A19D880F-05FC-4D3B-A006-743F0F84911E for GPT.

Once partitions have been created on /dev/sda, the following commands can be used to clone them to /dev/sdb.

# sfdisk -d /dev/sda > sda.dump
# sfdisk /dev/sdb < sda.dump

The HDD is prepared with a single Linux partition covering the whole drive at /dev/sdc1.

Building the RAID array

Create the RAID array for the SSDs.

Note:

All parts of an EFI system partition RAID array must be individually usable, that means that ESP can only placed in a RAID1 array.
The RAID superblock must be placed at the end of the EFI system partition using --metadata=1.0, otherwise the firmware will not be able to access the partition.

# mdadm --create --verbose --level=1 --metadata=1.0 --raid-devices=2 /dev/md/ESP /dev/sda2 /dev/sdb2

This example utilizes RAID0 for root, you may wish to substitute a different level based on your preferences or requirements.

# mdadm --create --verbose --level=0 --metadata=1.2 --raid-devices=2 /dev/md/root /dev/sda3 /dev/sdb3

Preparing the block devices

As explained in dm-crypt/Drive preparation, the devices are wiped with random data utilizing /dev/zero and a crypt device with a random key. Alternatively, you could use dd with /dev/random or /dev/urandom, though it will be much slower.

# cryptsetup open --type plain /dev/md/root container --key-file /dev/random
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/container bs=1M status=progress
# cryptsetup close container

And repeat above for the HDD (/dev/sdc1 in this example).

Set up encryption for /dev/md/root:

Warning: GRUB's support for LUKS2 is limited; see GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details. Use LUKS1 (cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1) for partitions that GRUB will need to unlock.

# cryptsetup -y -v luksFormat --type luks1 /dev/md/root
# cryptsetup open /dev/md/root root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/root
# mount /dev/mapper/root /mnt

And repeat for the HDD:

# cryptsetup -y -v luksFormat /dev/sdc1
# cryptsetup open /dev/sdc1 data
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/data
# mount --mkdir /dev/mapper/data /mnt/data

For UEFI systems, set up the EFI system partition:

# mkfs.fat -F32 /dev/md/ESP
# mount --mkdir /dev/md/ESP /mnt/efi

Configuring GRUB

Configure GRUB for the LUKS1 encrypted system by editing /etc/default/grub with the following:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="cryptdevice=/dev/md/root:root"
GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y

This article or section is a candidate for merging with GRUB#Troubleshooting.

Notes: GRUB troubleshooting issues belong in the GRUB page. It should be moved there and simply linked from this section. (Discuss in Talk:Dm-crypt/Encrypting an entire system)

If you have a USB keyboard on a newer system either enable legacy USB support in firmware or add the following to /etc/default/grub:

GRUB_TERMINAL_INPUT="usb_keyboard"
GRUB_PRELOAD_MODULES="usb usb_keyboard ohci uhci ehci"

Otherwise you may not be able to use your keyboard at the LUKS prompt.

See dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters and GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details.

Complete the GRUB install to both SSDs (in reality, installing only to /dev/sda will work).

# grub-install --target=i386-pc /dev/sda
# grub-install --target=i386-pc /dev/sdb
# grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/efi --bootloader-id=GRUB
# grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg

Creating the keyfiles

The next steps save you from entering your passphrase twice when you boot the system (once so GRUB can unlock the LUKS1 device, and second time once the initramfs assumes control of the system). This is done by creating a keyfile for the encryption and adding it to the initramfs image to allow the encrypt hook to unlock the root device. See dm-crypt/Device encryption#With a keyfile embedded in the initramfs for details.

Create the keyfile and add the key to /dev/md/root.
Create another keyfile for the HDD (/dev/sdc1) so it can also be unlocked at boot. For convenience, leave the passphrase created above in place as this can make recovery easier if you ever need it. Edit /etc/crypttab to decrypt the HDD at boot. See Dm-crypt/System configuration#Unlocking with a keyfile.

Configuring the system

Edit fstab to mount the root and data block devices and the ESP:

/dev/mapper/root  /	  ext4	rw,noatime 	   0 1
/dev/mapper/data  /data   ext4	defaults           0 2
/dev/md/ESP       /efi     vfat	rw,relatime,codepage=437,iocharset=iso8859-1,shortname=mixed,utf8,tz=UTC,errors=remount-ro  	0 2

Save the RAID configuration:

# mdadm --detail --scan >> /etc/mdadm.conf

Edit mkinitcpio.conf to include your keyfile and add the proper hooks:

FILES=(/crypto_keyfile.bin)
HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block mdadm_udev encrypt filesystems fsck)

See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details.

Plain dm-crypt

Contrary to LUKS, dm-crypt plain mode does not require a header on the encrypted device: this scenario exploits this feature to set up a system on an unpartitioned, encrypted disk that will be indistinguishable from a disk filled with random data, which could allow deniable encryption. See also wikipedia:Disk encryption#Full disk encryption.

Note that if full-disk encryption is not required, the methods using LUKS described in the sections above are better options for both system encryption and encrypted partitions. LUKS features like key management with multiple passphrases/key-files or re-encrypting a device in-place are unavailable with plain mode.

Plain dm-crypt encryption can be more resilient to damage than LUKS, because it does not rely on an encryption master-key which can be a single-point of failure if damaged. However, using plain mode also requires more manual configuration of encryption options to achieve the same cryptographic strength. See also Data-at-rest encryption#Cryptographic metadata. Using plain mode could also be considered if concerned with the problems explained in dm-crypt/Specialties#Discard/TRIM support for solid state drives (SSD).

Tip: If headerless encryption is your goal but you are unsure about the lack of key-derivation with plain mode, then two alternatives are:

dm-crypt LUKS mode with a detached header by using the cryptsetup --header option. It cannot be used with the standard encrypt hook, but the hook may be modified.
tcplay which offers headerless encryption but with the PBKDF2 function.

The scenario uses two USB sticks:

one for the boot device, which also allows storing the options required to open/unlock the plain encrypted device in the boot loader configuration, since typing them on each boot would be error prone;
another for the encryption key file, assuming it stored as raw bits so that to the eyes of an unaware attacker who might get the usbkey the encryption key will appear as random data instead of being visible as a normal file. See also Wikipedia:Security through obscurity, follow dm-crypt/Device encryption#Keyfiles to prepare the keyfile.

The disk layout is:

+----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ +----------------+ +----------------+
| Logical volume 1     | Logical volume 2     | Logical volume 3     | | Boot device    | | Encryption key |
|                      |                      |                      | |                | | file storage   |
| /                    | [SWAP]               | /home                | | /boot          | | (unpartitioned |
|                      |                      |                      | |                | | in example)    |
| /dev/MyVolGroup/root | /dev/MyVolGroup/swap | /dev/MyVolGroup/home | | /dev/sdb1      | | /dev/sdc       |
|----------------------+----------------------+----------------------| |----------------| |----------------|
| disk drive /dev/sda encrypted using plain mode and LVM             | | USB stick 1    | | USB stick 2    |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------+ +----------------+

Tip:

It is also possible to use a single USB key physical device:
- By putting the key on another partition (/dev/sdb2) of the USB storage device (/dev/sdb).
- By copying the keyfile to the initramfs directly. An example keyfile /etc/keyfile gets copied to the initramfs image by setting FILES=(/etc/keyfile) in /etc/mkinitcpio.conf. The way to instruct the encrypt hook to read the keyfile in the initramfs image is using rootfs: prefix before the filename, e.g. cryptkey=rootfs:/etc/keyfile.
Another option is using a passphrase with good entropy.

Preparing the disk

It is vital that the mapped device is filled with random data. In particular this applies to the scenario use case we apply here.

See dm-crypt/Drive preparation and dm-crypt/Drive preparation#dm-crypt specific methods

Preparing the non-boot partitions

See dm-crypt/Device encryption#Encryption options for plain mode for details.

Using the device /dev/sda, with the aes-xts cipher with a 512 bit key size and using a keyfile we have the following options for this scenario:

# cryptsetup --cipher=aes-xts-plain64 --offset=0 --key-file=/dev/sdc --key-size=512 open --type plain /dev/sda cryptlvm

Unlike encrypting with LUKS, the above command must be executed in full whenever the mapping needs to be re-established, so it is important to remember the cipher, and key file details.

We can now check a mapping entry has been made for /dev/mapper/cryptlvm:

# fdisk -l

Tip: A simpler alternative to using LVM, advocated in the cryptsetup FAQ for cases where LVM is not necessary, is to just create a filesystem on the entirety of the mapped dm-crypt device.

Next, we setup LVM logical volumes on the mapped device. See Install Arch Linux on LVM for further details:

# pvcreate /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
# vgcreate MyVolGroup /dev/mapper/cryptlvm
# lvcreate -L 32G MyVolGroup -n root
# lvcreate -L 10G MyVolGroup -n swap
# lvcreate -l 100%FREE MyVolGroup -n home

We format and mount them and activate swap. See File systems#Create a file system for further details:

# mkfs.ext4 /dev/MyVolGroup/root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/MyVolGroup/home
# mount /dev/MyVolGroup/root /mnt
# mount --mkdir /dev/MyVolGroup/home /mnt/home
# mkswap /dev/MyVolGroup/swap
# swapon /dev/MyVolGroup/swap

Preparing the boot partition

The /boot partition can be installed on the standard vfat partition of a USB stick, if required. But if manual partitioning is needed, then a small 200 MiB partition is all that is required. Create the partition using a partitioning tool of your choice.

Create a filesystem on the partition intended for /boot:

# mkfs.fat -F32 /dev/sdb1
# mount --mkdir /dev/sdb1 /mnt/boot

Configuring mkinitcpio

Make sure the lvm2 package is installed and add the keyboard, keymap, encrypt and lvm2 hooks to mkinitcpio.conf:

HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Configuring the boot loader

In order to boot the encrypted root partition, the following kernel parameters need to be set by the boot loader (note that 64 is the number of bytes in 512 bits):

cryptdevice=/dev/disk/by-id/disk-ID-of-sda:cryptlvm cryptkey=/dev/disk/by-id/disk-ID-of-sdc:0:64 crypto=:aes-xts-plain64:512:0:

The disk-ID-of-disk refers to the id of the referenced disk. See Persistent block device naming for details.

See dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters for details and other parameters that you may need.

Tip: If using GRUB, you can install it on the same USB as the /boot partition.

For BIOS:

# grub-install --target=i386-pc --recheck /dev/sdb

For UEFI:

# grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/boot --removable

Post-installation

You may wish to remove the USB sticks after booting. Since the /boot partition is not usually needed, the noauto option can be added to the relevant line in /etc/fstab:

/etc/fstab

# /dev/sdb1
/dev/sdb1 /boot vfat noauto,rw,noatime 0 2

However, when an update to anything used in the initramfs, or a kernel, or the bootloader is required; the /boot partition must be present and mounted. As the entry in fstab already exists, it can be mounted simply with:

# mount /boot

Encrypted boot partition (GRUB)

This setup utilizes the same partition layout and configuration as the previous #LVM on LUKS section, with the difference that the GRUB boot loader is used since it is capable of booting from an LVM logical volume and a LUKS1-encrypted /boot. See also GRUB#Encrypted /boot.

The disk layout in this example is:

+---------------------+----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+
| BIOS boot partition | EFI system partition | Logical volume 1     | Logical volume 2     | Logical volume 3     |
|                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                     | /efi                 | /                    | [SWAP]               | /home                |
|                     |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|                     |                      | /dev/MyVolGroup/root | /dev/MyVolGroup/swap | /dev/MyVolGroup/home |
| /dev/sda1           | /dev/sda2            |----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+
| unencrypted         | unencrypted          | /dev/sda3 encrypted using LVM on LUKS1                             |
+---------------------+----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------+

Tip:

All scenarios are intended as examples. It is, of course, possible to apply both of the two above distinct installation steps with the other scenarios as well. See also the variants linked in #LVM on LUKS.
You can use cryptboot script from cryptboot^AUR package for simplified encrypted boot management (mounting, unmounting, upgrading packages) and as a defense against Evil Maid attacks with UEFI Secure Boot. For more information and limitations see cryptboot project page.

Preparing the disk

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation.

For BIOS/GPT systems create a BIOS boot partition with size of 1 MiB for GRUB to store the second stage of BIOS bootloader. Do not mount the partition. For BIOS/MBR systems this is not necessary.

For UEFI systems create an EFI system partition with an appropriate size, it will later be mounted at /efi.

Create a partition of type 8309, which will later contain the encrypted container for the LVM.

Create the LUKS encrypted container:

Warning: GRUB's support for LUKS2 is limited; see GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details. Use LUKS1 (cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1) for partitions that GRUB will need to unlock.

# cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1 /dev/sda3

For more information about the available cryptsetup options see the LUKS encryption options prior to above command.

Your partition layout should look similar to this:

# gdisk -l /dev/sda

...
Number  Start (sector)    End (sector)  Size       Code  Name
   1            2048            4095   1024.0 KiB  EF02  BIOS boot partition
   2            4096         1130495   550.0 MiB   EF00  EFI System
   3         1130496        68239360   32.0 GiB    8309  Linux LUKS

Open the container:

# cryptsetup open /dev/sda3 cryptlvm

The decrypted container is now available at /dev/mapper/cryptlvm.

Preparing the logical volumes

The LVM logical volumes of this example follow the exact layout as the #LVM on LUKS scenario. Therefore, please follow #Preparing the logical volumes above and adjust as required.

If you plan to boot in UEFI mode, create a mountpoint for the EFI system partition at /efi for compatibility with grub-install and mount it:

# mount --mkdir /dev/sda2 /mnt/efi

At this point, you should have the following partitions and logical volumes inside of /mnt:

$ lsblk

NAME                  MAJ:MIN RM   SIZE RO TYPE  MOUNTPOINT
sda                   8:0      0   200G  0 disk
├─sda1                8:1      0     1M  0 part
├─sda2                8:2      0   550M  0 part  /mnt/efi
└─sda3                8:3      0   100G  0 part
  └─cryptlvm          254:0    0   100G  0 crypt
    ├─MyVolGroup-swap 254:1    0     8G  0 lvm   [SWAP]
    ├─MyVolGroup-root 254:2    0    32G  0 lvm   /mnt
    └─MyVolGroup-home 254:3    0    60G  0 lvm   /mnt/home

Configuring mkinitcpio

Make sure the lvm2 package is installed and add the keyboard, keymap, encrypt and lvm2 hooks to mkinitcpio.conf:

HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

If using the sd-encrypt hook with the systemd-based initramfs, the following needs to be set instead:

HOOKS=(base systemd autodetect modconf kms keyboard sd-vconsole block sd-encrypt lvm2 filesystems fsck)

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Configuring GRUB

Configure GRUB to allow booting from /boot on a LUKS1 encrypted partition:

/etc/default/grub

GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y

Set the kernel parameters, so that the initramfs can unlock the encrypted root partition. Using the encrypt hook:

/etc/default/grub

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... cryptdevice=UUID=device-UUID:cryptlvm ..."

If using the sd-encrypt hook, the following need to be set instead:

/etc/default/grub

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... rd.luks.name=device-UUID=cryptlvm ..."

See dm-crypt/System configuration#Kernel parameters and GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details. The device-UUID refers to the UUID of the LUKS superblock, in this case /dev/sda3 (the partition which holds the lvm containing the root filesystem). See Persistent block device naming.

install GRUB to the mounted ESP for UEFI booting:

# grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/efi --bootloader-id=GRUB --recheck

install GRUB to the disk for BIOS booting:

# grub-install --target=i386-pc --recheck /dev/sda

Generate GRUB's configuration file:

# grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg

If all commands finished without errors, GRUB should prompt for the passphrase to unlock the /dev/sda3 partition after the next reboot.

Avoiding having to enter the passphrase twice

This article or section is a candidate for merging with Dm-crypt/Device encryption#With a keyfile embedded in the initramfs.

Notes: Too much duplicated content, too much detail here for this overview page. (Discuss in Talk:Dm-crypt/Encrypting an entire system#Security Issue with Grub Keyfile)

While GRUB asks for a passphrase to unlock the LUKS1 encrypted partition after above instructions, the partition unlock is not passed on to the initramfs. Hence, you have to enter the passphrase twice at boot: once for GRUB and once for the initramfs.

This section deals with extra configuration to let the system boot by only entering the passphrase once, in GRUB. This is accomplished by with a keyfile embedded in the initramfs.

First create a keyfile and add it as LUKS key:

# dd bs=512 count=4 if=/dev/random of=/root/cryptlvm.keyfile iflag=fullblock
# chmod 000 /root/cryptlvm.keyfile
# cryptsetup -v luksAddKey /dev/sda3 /root/cryptlvm.keyfile

Add the keyfile to the initramfs image:

/etc/mkinitcpio.conf

FILES=(/root/cryptlvm.keyfile)

Recreate the initramfs image and secure the embedded keyfile:

# chmod 600 /boot/initramfs-linux*

Set the following kernel parameters to unlock the LUKS partition with the keyfile. Using the encrypt hook:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... cryptkey=rootfs:/root/cryptlvm.keyfile"

Or, using the sd-encrypt hook:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="... rd.luks.key=device-UUID=/root/cryptlvm.keyfile"

If for some reason the keyfile fails to unlock the boot partition, systemd will fallback to ask for a passphrase to unlock and, in case that is correct, continue booting.

Tip: If you want to encrypt the /boot partition to protect against offline tampering threats, the mkinitcpio-chkcryptoboot hook has been contributed to help.

Btrfs subvolumes with swap

This article or section is out of date.

Reason: Btrfs supports swapfile since 5.0 (Discuss in Talk:Dm-crypt/Encrypting_an_entire_system#Complete_guide_of_Btrfs_on_LUKS_full_disk_encryption)

The following example creates a full system encryption with LUKS1 using Btrfs subvolumes to simulate partitions.

If using UEFI, an EFI system partition (ESP) is required. /boot itself may reside on / and be encrypted; however, the ESP itself cannot be encrypted. In this example layout, the ESP is /dev/sda1 and is mounted at /efi. /boot itself is located on the system partition, /dev/sda2.

Since /boot resides on the LUKS1 encrypted /, GRUB must be used as the bootloader because only GRUB can load modules necessary to decrypt /boot (e.g., crypto.mod, cryptodisk.mod and luks.mod).

Additionally an optional plain-encrypted swap partition is shown.

+----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+
| EFI system partition | System partition     | Swap partition       |
| unencrypted          | LUKS1-encrypted      | plain-encrypted      |
|                      |                      |                      |
| /efi                 | /                    | [SWAP]               |
| /dev/sda1            | /dev/sda2            | /dev/sda3            |
+----------------------+----------------------+----------------------+

Preparing the disk

Note: It is not possible to use btrfs partitioning as described in Btrfs#Partitionless Btrfs disk when using LUKS. Traditional partitioning must be used, even if it is just to create one partition.

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation. If you are using UEFI create an EFI system partition with an appropriate size. It will later be mounted at /efi. If you are going to create an encrypted swap partition, create the partition for it, but do not mark it as swap, since plain dm-crypt will be used with the partition.

Create the needed partitions, at least one for / (e.g. /dev/sda2). See the Partitioning article.

Preparing the system partition

Create LUKS container

Warning: GRUB's support for LUKS2 is limited; see GRUB#Encrypted /boot for details. Use LUKS1 (cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks1) for partitions that GRUB will need to unlock.

Follow dm-crypt/Device encryption#Encrypting devices with LUKS mode to setup /dev/sda2 for LUKS. See the dm-crypt/Device encryption#Encryption options for LUKS mode before doing so for a list of encryption options.

Unlock LUKS container

Now follow dm-crypt/Device encryption#Unlocking/Mapping LUKS partitions with the device mapper to unlock the LUKS container and map it.

Format mapped device

Proceed to format the mapped device as described in Btrfs#File system on a single device, where /dev/partition is the name of the mapped device (i.e., /dev/mapper/root) and not /dev/sda2.

Mount mapped device

Finally, mount the now-formatted mapped device (i.e., /dev/mapper/root) to /mnt.

Creating btrfs subvolumes

This article or section is a candidate for merging with Btrfs.

Notes: The subvolume layout is not specific to an encrypted system. (Discuss in Talk:Dm-crypt/Encrypting an entire system)

Layout

Subvolumes will be used to simulate partitions, but other (nested) subvolumes will also be created. Here is a partial representation of what the following example will generate:

subvolid=5
  |
  ├── @ -|
  |     contained directories:
  |       ├── /usr
  |       ├── /bin
  |       ├── /.snapshots
  |       ├── ...
  |
  ├── @home
  ├── @snapshots
  ├── @var_log
  └── @...

This section follows the Snapper#Suggested filesystem layout, which is most useful when used with Snapper. You should also consult Btrfs Wiki SysadminGuide#Layout.

Create subvolumes for initial mount

Here we are using the convention of prefixing @ to subvolume names that will be used as mount points, and @ will be the subvolume that is mounted as /.

Following the Btrfs#Creating a subvolume article, create subvolumes at /mnt/@, /mnt/@snapshots, and /mnt/@home.

Create any additional subvolumes you wish to use as mount points now.

Create subvolumes for excludes

Create any subvolumes you do not want to have snapshots of when taking a snapshot of /. For example, you probably do not want to take snapshots of /var/cache/pacman/pkg. These subvolumes will be nested under the @ subvolume, but just as easily could have been created earlier at the same level as @ according to your preference.

Since the @ subvolume is mounted at /mnt you will need to create a subvolume at /mnt/var/cache/pacman/pkg for this example. You may have to create any parent directories first.

Other directories you may wish to do this with are /var/abs, /var/tmp, and /srv.

Mount top-level subvolumes

Unmount the system partition at /mnt.

Now mount the newly created @ subvolume which will serve as / to /mnt using the subvol= mount option. Assuming the mapped device is named root, the command would look like:

# mount -o compress=zstd,subvol=@ /dev/mapper/root /mnt

See Btrfs#Mounting subvolumes for more details.

Also mount the other subvolumes to their respective mount points: @home to /mnt/home and @snapshots to /mnt/.snapshots.

Mount ESP

If you prepared an EFI system partition earlier, create its mount point and mount it now.

Note: Btrfs snapshots will exclude /efi, since it is not a btrfs file system.

At the pacstrap installation step, the btrfs-progs must be installed in addition to the base meta package.

Configuring mkinitcpio

Create keyfile

In order for GRUB to open the LUKS partition without having the user enter their passphrase twice, we will use a keyfile embedded in the initramfs. Follow dm-crypt/Device encryption#With a keyfile embedded in the initramfs making sure to add the key to /dev/sda2 at the luksAddKey step.

Edit mkinitcpio.conf

After creating, adding, and embedding the key as described above, add the encrypt hook to mkinitcpio.conf as well as any other hooks you require.

Regenerate the initramfs after saving the changes. See dm-crypt/System configuration#mkinitcpio for details and other hooks that you may need.

Tip: You may want to add BINARIES=(btrfs) to your /etc/mkinitcpio.conf. See the Btrfs#Corruption recovery article.

Configuring the boot loader

Install GRUB to /dev/sda. Then, edit /etc/default/grub as instructed in the GRUB#Additional arguments, GRUB#Encrypted /boot and dm-crypt/System configuration#Using encrypt hook, following both the instructions for an encrypted root and boot partition. Finally, generate the GRUB configuration file. Note that you will need to pass kernel parameters for the root mount point as instructed in Btrfs#Mounting subvolume as root.

Configuring swap

If you created a partition to be used for encrypted swap, now is the time to configure it. Follow the instructions at dm-crypt/Swap encryption.

Root on ZFS

To use dm-crypt with ZFS, see ZFS#Encryption in ZFS using dm-crypt.

Additionally, ZFS features native encryption, which may also be utilized to encrypt the system root, excluding the boot loader and filesystem metadata. See:

Installation guide on the OpenZFS page.
Install Arch Linux on ZFS#Installation

After the installation, a boot loader can be verified with Secure Boot on UEFI-based systems.

Simple encrypted root with TPM2 and Secure Boot

This example covers a full system encryption with dm-crypt + LUKS, TPM2 and Secure Boot : Only the ESP remains unencrypted, with a Unified kernel image and Systemd-boot residing on it, both of which can be signed for use with Secure Boot, providing a reasonably safe boot chain.

Be aware though that as long as the system is not tempered with, the root partition will automatically be decrypted upon boot, without a password prompt.

In this example, partitions are created respecting Systemd#GPT partition automounting, there is no need for an fstab or crypttab file.

+-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+
| ESP                   | System partition                               |
| unencrypted           | encrypted                                      |
|                       |                                                |
| /efi                  | /                                              |
|                       |                                                |
|                       | /dev/mapper/root                               |
|                       |------------------------------------------------|
| /dev/sda1             | /dev/sda2                                      |
+-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+

Follow the Installation guide up to step 1.9 Partition the disks

Partition the disks

Prior to creating any partitions, you should inform yourself about the importance and methods to securely erase the disk, described in dm-crypt/Drive preparation.

Additionally, check that your disk reports the correct sector size.

Make sure to create a GPT partition table. Then create the needed partitions for / (e.g. /dev/sda2) and /efi (/dev/sda1). See Partitioning.

See EFI system partition#GPT partitioned disks to create the ESP with the appropriate partition GUID.
For the Luks (root) partition, you can use gdisk with partition type 8304, or fdisk with partition type 23 Linux root (x86-64) (if your architecture is x86-64). See GPT fdisk#Partition type.

Format the partitions

Root partition

The following commands create and mount the encrypted root partition, and make use of the TPM to store the encryption key. See dm-crypt/Encrypting a non-root file system#Partition (which, despite the title, can be applied to root partitions, as long as mkinitcpio and the boot loader are correctly configured), and Trusted Platform Module#systemd-cryptenroll.

If you want to use particular non-default encryption options (e.g. cipher, key length), or if you don't want to use TPM based decryption, see the encryption options before executing the first command.

We will create a luks volume with a key bound to the TPM PCR 7 (default, Secure Boot state) and a recovery key to be used in case of any problem. The TPM will automatically release the key as long as the boot chain is not tempered with. See systemd-cryptenroll(1).

Create the luks volume (you can simply use a blank password, as it will be wiped in the next step)

# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sda2
# systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda2 --recovery-key
# systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda2 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto
# cryptsetup open /dev/sda2 root
# mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/root

ESP

See EFI system partition#Format the partition.

Mount the file systems

At Installation guide#Mount the file systems you will have to mount the mapped device, not the actual partitions, i.e.

# mount /dev/mapper/root /mnt
# mount --mkdir /dev/sda1 /mnt/efi

Continue the installation process until Installation guide#Initramfs. You can skip Installation guide#Fstab.

Initramfs

To build a working systemd based initramfs, modify the HOOKS= line in mkinitcpio.conf as follows:

HOOKS=(systemd autodetect modconf kms keyboard sd-vconsole block sd-encrypt filesystems fsck)

Next, see Unified kernel image#mkinitcpio to configure mkinitcpio for Unified kernel images.

Do not regenerate the initramfs yet, as the /efi/EFI/Linux directory needs to be created by the boot loader installer first.

Boot loader

Install systemd-boot with

# bootctl install

The Unified kernel image generated by mkinitcpio will be automatically recognized and does not need an entry in /efi/loader/entries

See Systemd-boot#Updating the EFI boot manager and Systemd-boot#Loader configuration for further configuration.

Finalizing the installation

First, Regenerate the initramfs, and make sure the image generation is successful.

Make sure you did not forget to set a root password, reboot to finish the installation.

Secure Boot

You can now sign the boot loader executables and the EFI binary, in order to enable Secure Boot. For a quick and easy way, see Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot#sbctl